

Message Text

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 4 BELGRADE 1308

EUR ONLY

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: YO
SUBJECT: US GOALS AND OBJECTIVES IN YUGOSLAVIA

REF: (A) 77 STATE 291277 (B) 77 STATE 296053 (C) 77 STATE 295599

1. IN VIEWTHS ON BOTH THE GENERAL APPROACH TO THE FUTURE
OF OUR RELATIONSHIP AND VIRTUALLY EVERY SPECIFIC ASPECT
-, \$ 8, .8\$ 5 9* 974 -, \$ 6974 0430-4-589, *94 5859 ;8 85,
WE TRUST THAT DEPARTMENT WILL UNDERSTAND THAT FOLLOWING IS
RATHER GENERAL RESPONSE TO FEB 15 DEADLINE TO PUT IMPLEMENTING
MEAT ON BONES OF "US GOALS AND OBJECTIVES" EXERCISE. AFTER
TITO VISIT WE WILL WANT TO TAKE ANOTHER, MORE SEARCHING LOOK
AT PRIORITIES FOR THE NEXT YEAR OR TWO.

2. INHERENT IN OUR GOALS AND OBJECTIVES IN YUGOSLAVIA ARE THE
TWO ESSENTIAL INTERESTS THE US CONTINUES TO HAVE IN THIS
COUNTRY: TO PRESERVE YUGOSLAVIA'S INDEPENDENCE FROM THE
SOVIET UNION AND TO MODERATE YUGOSLAV POLICIES AND
ACTIVITIES WHICH CONFLICT WITH THOSE OF THE US. OVER THE
NEXT TWO YEARS THE IMPORTANCE OF THESE TWO INTERESTS, IF
ANYTHING, IS LIKELY TO INCREASE AND US PRIORITIES SHOULD BE
ATTENTIVE TO DEVELOPMENTS WHICH MAY AFFECT THESE INTERESTS.

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3. TITO, AT 85, IS STILL IN CHARGE AND INVOLVED WITH
MAJOR POLICY DECISIONS. HOWEVER, MANY YUGOSLAVS
PERCEIVE THE 11TH LCY CONGRESS IN JUNE AS AN INSTRUMENT
TO SOLIDIFY THE FRAMEWORK FOR THE POST-TITO ERA. THUS,
IN A SENSE, YUGOSLAVIA MAY BE SEEN AS HAVING ENTERED
ITS TITO TRANSITION PERIOD. BUT DESPITE THE GOY'S ATTEMPTS
TO ENCOURAGE ACCEPTANCE OF CONTINUITY, MANY QUESTION MARKS IN
THE FORM OF NATIONALISTIC, ECONOMIC, AND IDEOLOGICAL TENSIONS

ARE EVIDENT. IN SHORT, THE DIRECTION OF POST-TITO YUGOSLAVIA IS NOT AT ALL CERTAIN.

4. IN THE NEXT TWO YEARS YUGOSLAVIA WILL CONTINUE TO PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE ON MULTILATERAL ISSUES WHICH BEAR ON US POLICY. THE OUTCOME OF THE BELGRADE CSCE CONFERENCE IS NOT YET CLEAR, BUT YUGOSLAVIA HAS BEEN AN IMPORTANT PLAYER IN THE NEUTRALS/NON-ALIGNED GROUPING. AS A MEMBER OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT (NAM) COORDINATING BUREAU, TO MEET IN KABUL THIS SPRING, AND AS HOST FOR THE JULY NAM FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING, YUGOSLAVIA'S PARTICIPATION IN DELIBERATIONS OVER A WIDE RANGE OF KEY ISSUES WILL BE EFFECTIVE AND ITS VOICE INFLUENTIAL. IT WILL ALSO CONTINUE TO BE ACTIVE IN THE UN SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT, WHICH IS A YUGOSLAV BIRTHCHILD, AND IN OTHER THIRD WORLD AREAS SUCH AS THE NORTH-SOUTH RELATIONSHIP.

5. WE MUST NOT FORGET THAT THROUGH ITS IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION, YUGOSLAVIA WILL CONTINUE TO REGARD THE US AS THE MAJOR "CAPITALIST" AND "PROGRESSIVE" MOVEMENTS. NOR CAN WE EXPECT TO HAVE ANYTHING BUT LIMITED IMPACT ON YUGOSLAVIA'S INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT. NEVERTHELESS, OUR EFFORTS CAN BE MEANINGFUL IF OUR GOALS AND OBJECTIVES ARE GEARED TO ENGAGE YUGOSLAVIA IN A MATURE DIALOGUE SEEKING TO ACHIEVE A STATE OF MUTUAL TRUST AND

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CONFIDENCE. AND WE NEED TO GIVE CONCRETE MEANING TO THIS DIALOGUE BY BUILDING A STRONGER FABRIC OF ECONOMIC, MILITARY AND CULTURAL COOPERATION. WE SHOULD ENCOURAGE OUR WESTERN PARTNERS TO JOIN US IN THIS TASK.

6. HERE ARE THE APPROACHES WE RECOMMEND. COMMENTS RESPOND TO REF C'S MAJOR HEADINGS. WE DO NOT TREAT ALL THE GOALS AND OBJECTIVES DIRECTLY BUT HIGHLIGHT THOSE WHICH DESERVE SPECIAL ATTENTION.

7. MAINTENANCE OF YUGOSLAVIA'S INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND CLOSER BILATERAL RELATIONS.

-- OUR SUPPORT FOR YUGOSLAV INDEPENDENCE AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY IS WELL MANIFESTED BY APPROPRIATELY TIMED HIGH LEVEL STATEMENTS, BOTH PUBLIC AND PRIVATE, REAFFIRMING OUR CONTINUING COMMITMENT TO THIS GOAL. THE JOINT STATEMENTS WHICH WILL EMERGE FROM PRESIDENT TITO'S VISIT WILL PLAY AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN THIS RESPECT AND SET THE CONTEXT FOR OUR OVERALL RELATIONSHIP FOR THE PERIOD AHEAD. EQUALLY IMPORTANT, WE MUST ESCHEW ACTIONS WHICH IN YUGOSLAV MINDS WOULD UNDERMINE THIS COMMITMENT. THE GOY IS A SEVERE CRITIC OF BLOC POLITICS AND SUPERPOWER DOMINATION. IT REACTS SHARPLY TO LESS THAN

EQUAL TREATMENT AND IS ENRAGED BY THE SMALLEST EXAMPLE OF WHAT IT CONSIDERS "PRESSURE". IN OUR BILATERAL CONTACTS WE SHOULD RECOGNIZE YUGOSLAVIA'S VITAL CONCERNS AND INTERESTS AS WELL AS FORCEFULLY AND CANDIDLY EXPLAIN, WHERE POLICY DIFFERENCES EMERGE, OUR OWN POSITIONS.

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-- THE EXCHANGE OF LETTERS BETWEEN PRESIDENTS CARTER AND TITO ON SIGNIFICANT FOREIGN POLICY DEVELOPMENTS HAS HELPED TO GENERATE AND SUSTAIN A SUBSTANTIAL IMPROVEMENT IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS. THIS EXCHANGE, AS WELL AS THE HIGH LEVEL BRIEFINGS WE HAVE PROVIDED THEY GOY, HAVE ADDED A SPECIAL DIMENSION TO OUR RELATIONSHIP. APART FROM THEIR TANGIBLE BENEFITS, THEY ALSO DEMONSTRATE TO THE GOY OUR DESIRE TO BASE OUR RELATIONSHIP ON MUTUAL RESPECT. WE URGE THAT WE CONTINUE THIS PRACTICE.

-- LOOKING TOWARD THE POST-TITO FUTURE WE MUST BUILD CONTACTS AND PROMOTE A POLITICAL DIALOGUE WITH EMERGING POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND MILITARY LEADERS. CARRYING OFF IN STYLE THE NOW AGREED EXCHANGE BETWEEN THE LCY AND THE MAJOR AMERICAN POLITICAL PARTIES THIS FALL IS BUT ONE APPROACH. THE UNION OF SOCIALIST YOUTH AND THE SOCIALIST ALLIANCE ARE ALSO TARGETS OF OUR ATTENTION. ONE OF OUR PRINCIPAL PURPOSES IN ENHANCING MILITARY COOPERATION IS TO INCREASE OUR CONTACTS WITH INDIVIDUAL YUGOSLAV MILITARY LEADERS AND GAIN A GREATER APPRECIATION OF THEIR POLITICAL ROLE AND VIEWS.

-- OUR CULTURAL, EDUCATIONAL, AND SCIENTIFIC EXCHANGES AND OUR INFORMATION PROGRAM MAKE CRUCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO BUILDING THE FABRIC OF MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING AND COOPERATION WE WILL NEED TO WEATHER THE TITO TRANSITION. WE PLAN TO EXPAND EXISTING PROGRAMS AND ADD NEW FACETS SUCH AS A USIS BRANCH POST IN TITOGRAĐ. WE ARE

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WORKING TO BROADEN THE COMPETENCE OF THE AMERICAN-YUGOSLAV EDUCATION COMMISSION AND TO RESIST YUGOSLAV ATTEMPTS TO EMPHASIZE HARD VS SOCIAL SCIENCES IN THE FULBRIGHT PROGRAM. REGARDING THE SCIENTIFIC EXCHANGE PROGRAM, UNLESS WE CAN REACH AGREEMENT WITHIN THE USG TO CONTINUE USING OUR DINARS TO MATCH CONTRIBUTIONS, THE PROGRAM WILL DROP OFF SHARPLY -- SIGNALLING DECLINING US INTEREST IN THIS COUNTRY AT THE VERY TIME WE SHOULD BE DOING THE REVERSE.

-- OUR ANTI-TERRORISM OBJECTIVE HERE MUST ALSO BE SEEN IN THE LIGHT OF THE NEED TO STRENGTHEN YUGOSLAV CONFIDENCE IN OUR COMMITMENT TO THE TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND STABILITY OF YUGOSLAVIA IN THE TITO TRANSITION ERA. WE HAVE TO CONTINUE TO DEMONSTRATE BY DDED OUR INTENT TO INHIBIT ANTI-YUGOSLAV TERRORISM IN THE US. A PUBLIC US STATEMENT OPPOSING SEPARATIST ATTEMPTS TO DISMEMBER YUGOSLAVIA, ESPECIALLY THROUGH TERRORIST METHODS, WOULD BE EXTREMELY USEFUL. ON THE OTHER HAND, WE MUST CONTINUE TO INSIST TO THE GOY THAT ANTI-TERRORISM CANNOT BE A SELECTIVE ACTIVITY, THAT THERE ARE NOT GOOD TERRORISTS AND BAD TERRORISTS. WE ARE HEARTENED BY THEIR AGREEMENT TO JOIN OUR ANTI-TERRORIST CONTACT GROUP IN NEW YORK.

8. LIBERALIZATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS. WE HAVE NO QUALMS ABOUT ENGAGING THE GOY IN A DIALOGUE ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS. IN DOING SO, HOWEVER, WE MUST RECOGNIZE THAT YUGOSLAVIA AS A "SOCIALIST" NATION BELIEVES THAT MAN'S GAINING CONTROL OVER HIS OWN DESTINY DEPENDS MORE ON ECONOMIC RIGHTS AND EQUALITY THAN ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND ORGANIZED POLITICAL OPPOSITON. THEY SEE A CAPITALIST'S ARBITRARY CONTROL OVER HIS WORKERS AND MORE THAN EQUAL IMPACT ON GOVERNMENTAL DECISIONS AS A GREAT BARRIER TO INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM AND EQUALITY. WE MUST ALSO BE ALERT TO THE USEFUL LIMITS OF A DIALOGUE AND GUARD AGAINST FORCING THIS RELATIVELY MOST LIBERAL COMMUNIST
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REGIME TO JOIN FORCES WITH COMRADES TO THE EAST IN ARGUING THAT ONLY COMMUNIST SOCIETIES PROVIDE TRUE HUMAN RIGHTS (AS HAPPENED BRIEFLY EARLY LAST YEAR WHEN YUGOSLAV HUMAN RIGHTS FAILINGS WERE A SUBJECT OF ATTENTION IN WESTERN PRESS. MORE RECENTLY THEY HAVE CITED HUMAN RIGHTS FAILINGS IN THE EAST AS WELL AS THE WEST.)

-- THE GOY MAINTAINS THAT ITS CONSTITUTION AND LAWS ON ITS POLICE, SECURITY AND JUDICIAL POWERS ARE WELL-DEFINED,

PROPERLY SUITED FOR PARTICULAR SECURITY NEEDS OF A COUNTRY WITH MAJOR EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL THREATS, AND NOT ARBITRARY. IT ALSO CONTENTS THAT THE YUGOSLAV SYSTEM GUARANTEES BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS. THERE IS CONSIDERABLY MORE FREEDOM HERE THAN IN THE SOVIET UNION AND OTHER EAST EUROPEAN NATIONS, BUT CONSIDERABLY LESS THAN IN THE WEST. WE CANNOT CHANGE YUGOSLAV LAWS AND MAY EVEN HAVE PROBLEMS TRYING TO CHANGE YUGOSLAV ATTITUDES. HOWEVER, WE CAN WORK QUIETLY TO TRY TO PERSUADE THE GOY THAT IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LAWS NEED NOT BE PURSUED WITH A POLICE STATE MENTALITY, AND TO TRY TO INSTILL A SENSE THAT "LOYAL" OPPOSITION NEED NOT LEAD TO CENTRIFUGATION OF THE COUNTRY (ALTHOUGH JUDGING BY THE EVENTS OF 1971, WE COULD NOT IN GOOD CONSCIENCE GUARANTEE THIS).

-- WE WILL CONTINUE TO BRING THE PROBLEM OF DUAL NATIONALS TO THE GOY'S ATTENTION. RESOLUTION OF THIS ISSUE, WHICH INVOLVES A CONFLICT OF NATIONALITY LAW, WILL REQUIRE EXAMINATION BY THE DEPARTMENT'S EXPERTS. PENDING RESOLUTION, YUGOSLAV TREATMENT OF DUAL NATIONALS IS LIKELY TO BE LARGELY A FUNCTION OF THE STATE OF OUR RELATIONS.

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9. BROADENING ECONOMIC TIES. NO SINGLE STRAND OF A DURABLE FABRIC OF COOPERATION FOR THE FUTURE IS MORE IMPORTANT THAN THE ECONOMIC DIMENSION BRINGING ABOUT A MAJOR INCREASE IN TRADE AND INVESTMENT IS ONE OF OUR HIGHEST PRIORITIES FOR THE NEXT TWO YEARS.

-- SINCE YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENTAL AND COMMERCIAL BODIES HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO ORGANIZE PROPERLY TO IMPROVE THEIR OVERALL TRADE RELATIONS WITH THE U.S., WE HAVE BEGUN A MAJOR EFFORT TO IDENTIFY PROBLEMS AND UNCOVER OPPORTUNITIES FOR INCREASED TRADE. CONTINUING DECENTRALIZATION HAS PLACED MORE RESPONSIBILITY FOR FOREIGN TRADE IN THE REPUBLICS. THIS IS

WHERE WE ARE CONCENTRATING OUR EFFORTS. THIS LOCAL APPROACH HAS ELICITED GOOD RESPONSE FROM REPUBLICAN AND MUNICIPAL AUTHORITIES. ON THE NATIONAL LEVEL, WE WILL CONTINUE TO RESEARCH AND SPONSOR TECHNICAL SALES SEMINARS, MISSIONS, AND COMMERCIAL EXHIBITS, AS WELL AS MAINTAINING OUR INTENSIVE PROGRAM OF BUSINESS COUNSELLING.

-- IN PRINCIPLE, YUGOSLAV AUTHORITIES AND ENTERPRISES REMAIN RESPONSIVE TO FOREIGN INVESTMENT. IN PRACTICE THERE ARE STILL TENSIONS BETWEEN THE MORE WESTERN-ORIENTED TECHNICIANS AND MANAGERS AND SOME INFLUENTIAL GOVERNMENT AND PARTY FUNCTIONARIES WHO RETAIN A LINGERING CLASSICAL MARXISM/LENINISM. THE FUTURE OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN YUGOSLAVIA WILL DEPEND ON THE FINAL RESOLUTION OF THESE DIFFERENCES IN THE FORM OF THE NEW LAW ON SECRET

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JOINT VENTURES. WE WILL CONTINUE TO PRESS THE YUGOSLAVS FOR MORE LIBERAL TREATMENT OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT, NOT LEAST FOR THE INCREASED TECHNICAL AND TRADE CONNECTIONS WHICH COULD BE FORGED WITH THE WEST.

-- THE SUPERGUARANTEE IMPASSE IS ONE OF THE MORE STUBBORN PROBLEMS IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP. AFTER NEARLY A YEAR OF GOY RECALCITRANCE AND A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF TALKING PAST EACH OTHER, WE MAY NOW BE CLOSER TO A SETTLEMENT. THE KEY IS THE CONSTRUCTION OF A GUARANTEE FORMULA WHICH MEETS THE REQUIREMENTS OF EXIM AND WHICH THE GOY WILL BE ABLE TO APPLY TO OTHER EXPORT CREDIT-SUPPLYING NATIONS AS WELL AS TO THE US. ONCE THIS IS SETTLED, EXIM FINANCING, IF IT RESUMES QUICKLY, WILL REGAIN ITS POSITION AS A VERY IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN OUR ECONOMIC LINKS WITH YUGOSLAVIA.

-- FOR OVER A YEAR THE KRSKO SITUATION HAS BEEN A MAJOR IRRITANT IN US-YUGOSLAV RELATIONS. ALTHOUGH WE REACHED A PARTIAL AGREEMENT LAST YEAR, WE MUST STILL SOLVE THE RETRANSFER/RE-PROCESSING QUESTIONS. NEGOTIATIONS ARE NOW IN PROGRESS TO BE HELD IN THE SECOND HALF OF FEBRUARY, BUT WE COULD WELL HAVE THIS ON OUR PLATE FOR MANY MORE MONTHS AS A MAJOR PROBLEM.

-- IN DEALING WITH THE GOY ON KRSKO WE HAVE ATTEMPTED TO ASSURE THEM THAT OUR CONCERNS ARE MOTIVATED NOT BY POLITICAL OR COMMERCIAL DESIRES BUT BY OUR COMMON NONPROLIFERATION GOALS. WE HAVE ALSO SOUGHT TO DISSUADE THEM FROM TURNING AWAY FROM US NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS FOR FUTURE PROJECTS AS A RESULT OF THEIR REACTION TO KRSKO. INTERNATIONALLY, THE GOY HAS PLAYED A GENERALLY POSITIVE ROLE IN NONPROLIFERATION CONSIDERATIONS, AND ITS POSITIONS, FOR THE MOST PART, PARALLEL OURS. HOWEVER, THE GOY DOES NOT WANT POLICIES "IMPOSED" UPON IT BY THE "NUCLEAR MONOPOLY". WITH SECRET

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THE RECOGNITION THAT YUGOSLAVIA'S VOICE IS INFLUENTIAL IN THE
THIRD WORLD, WE WILL CONTINUE TO INVEST OUR ENERGIES FOR ACCEPTANCE
OF OUR POLICIES.

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10.BILATERAL MILITARY LINKS. ALONG WITH EXPANDING
ECONOMIC TIES, BUILDING A MEANINGFUL MILITARY RELATIONSHIP IS
OUR HIGHEST TANGIBLE PRIORITY. THIS CAN BE NURTURED BY A VARIETY
OF ACTIVITIES, BUT MILITARY SALES ARE THE KEY. WE MUST CONVINCE
THE GOY THAT THE PRESIDENT'S APPROVAL OF THE NEW MILITARY SALES
POLICY WAS NOT AN EMPTY GESTURE. THE GOY IS SEEKING TO LESSEN
ITS EQUIPMENT DEPENDENCY ON THE SOVIET UNION. WE HAVE BEEN
URGIN THE YUGOSLAV MILITARY TO BE MORE OPEN IN ITS CONTACT
WITH US AND MORE PRECISE IN DEFINING ITS NEEDS. THEY HAVE BEGUN
TO RESPOND, INTER ALIA, BY AGREEING TO BUY A NUMBER OF ITEMS
CONSIDERABLY LESS THAN STATE-OF-THE-ART.
IN RETURN WE SHOULD SHOW OUR GOOD WILL BY BREADING LOOSE ONE
OR TWO MAJOR ITEMS. THE NEW MILITARY RELATIONSHIP IS NOT
LIMITED TO "SUPPLY" ALONE. A CONTINUED BRISK PACE OF HIGH LEVEL
VISITS CAN HAVE A CRITICAL IMPACT ON OUR RELATIONSHIP.
PROFESSIONAL TRAINING IS ALSO KEY FOR ITS IMPACT ON THE FUTURE
LEADERS OF THE YUGOSLAV MILITARY (AND PERHAPS OF YUGOSLAVIA ITSELF).
THEREFORE, WE CONTINUE TO URGE A SOLUTION TO THE FUNDING PROBLEM.
WE SHOULD CONTINUE A REGULAR SCHEDULE OF SIP VISITS TO
YUGOSLAV PORTS AND GET UNDERWAY USN SHIP REPAIR AT TIVAT.
WE BELIEVE AJOINT MILITARY COOPERATION WORKING GROUP SHOULD BE
ESTABLISHED TO REVIEW PERIODICALLY THE RESULTS OR LACK THEREOF
IN EACH ASPECT OF THE RELATIONSHIP AND TO PROVIDE THE

POLITICAL LEVEL OF EACH GOVERNMENT WITH A BALANCE SHEET.

11. A POSITIVE YUGOSLAV INTERNATIONAL ROLE. WE MUST ENCOURAGE
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YUGOSLAVIA TO PLAY A MODERATING ROLE IN THE NAM USING SUCH AVENUES
AS PRESIDENTIAL EXCHANGES, FREQUENT DEMARCHES, AND APPROPRIATE
EXPERT DISCUSSIONS TO GET OUR POINTS ACROSS. BUT IN
REALISTICALLY APPROACHING THIS OBJECTIVE, WE MUST CONTINUE
TO RECOGNIZE THAT US CONCERNS WILL NOT CHANGE YUGOSLAVIA'
BASIC APPROACH. THE GOY WILL BE MOTIVATED ON NON-ALIGNED ISSUES
MORE BY THE NON-ALIGNED CONSENSUS AND THE EFFECT ITS STAND ON
ISSUES WILL HAVE ON ITS LEADERSHIP POSITION WITHIN THE NAM.
NEVERTHELESS, WE SHOULD TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THE POSITIVE AT-
MOSPHERIC ELEMENT WHICH HAS EMERGED FROM YUGOSLAVIA'S PERCEPTION OF
THE CHANGE IN US ATTITUDE TOWARD THE NAM TO SEEK TACTICAL
SHIFTS ON A LIMITED NUMBER OF ISSUES WHERE THE YUGOSLAVS HAVE
SOME FLEXIBILITY AND WE HAVE AN INTEREST.
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